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Ah, beer.  The necessary lubricant of science.  Always the unacknowledged collaborator in the Nobel Prize.  Whether critical to the formulation of quantum mechanics in the pubs of Copenhagen, smoothing the way to the discovery of the double-helix in Cambridge, or helping celebrate an iGEM victory in that other Cambridge (congratulations again, almost-Dr. Brown and team), beer is always there.

And now it is helping me think about the future of biological manufacturing.  Not just by drinking it, though I can't say it hurts.  Yet.

Anyway, the rise of craft brewing in the US is an interesting test case, and a proof of principle, of distributed biological manufacturing successfully emerging in a market dominated by large scale industrial production.  To wit, Figure 1:

US_Brewery_Count_Biodesic.png
Figure 1.  The number of US large and small breweries over the last century.  The (official) count was forced to zero during Prohibition.  (Click on image for full-size.)

A Short, Oversimplified History of Craft Brewing

Before Prohibition, the vast majority of beer produced in the US was brewed by relatively small operations and distributed locally.  There was no refrigeration, nor were there highways and trucks, so beer had to drunk rather than produced and stored in large quantities (modulo some small amount of storage in basements, caves, etc.).  Moreover, the official count of breweries went to zero during the years 1920-1933.  After Prohibition, brewing was regulated and small scale producers were basically shut out of the market.

With the aid of refrigeration and transportation, large scale breweries took off.  Consolidation took its toll -- beer is pretty close to a commodity, after all -- and the number of breweries in the US shrank until about 1980.  In 1979, Jimmy Carter signed legislation reopening the market to small brewers.  This is an interesting and crucial point, because as far as I can tell nothing else substantive changed about the market.  Deregulation reopened the market to craft brewers and the industry blossomed through organic growth and the preferences of consumers.  (Conclusion: Emerging small scale, distributed production can compete against an installed large scale infrastructure base.)

The definition of a "craft" brewer varies a bit across the various interested organizations.  According to the Brewers Association, "An American Craft Brewer is small, independent, and traditional."  Small means less than 2 million barrels a year (at 26 Imperial gal or 30.6 standard gal per barrel); independent means less than 25% owned by a non-craft brewer; traditional means either an all malt flagship beer or 50% of total volume in malt beer.  There is a profusion of other requirements to qualify as a craft brewer, some of which depend on jurisdiction, and which are important for such practical concerns as calculating excise tax.  Wikipedia puts the barrier for a craft brewer at less than 15,000 barrels a year.  According to the Brewers Association, as of the middle of 2009 there are about 1500 craft brewers in the US, and about 20 large brewers, and about 20 "others", with brewpubs accounting for about 2/3 of the craft brewers. 

Show Me the Hops.  Or Wheat.  Or Honey (if you must).

Brewpubs and microbreweries are so common that the majority of Americans live within 10 miles of a craft brewer, and it is a good bet that there is one quite close to where you live.  The Beer Mapping Project can help you verify this fact.  Please conduct your field research on foot.

Beer generates retail revenues of about $100 billion in the US (brewery revenues are probably less than half that), contributing combined direct and indirect jobs of about 1.9 million.  But craft brewers account for only a small fraction of the total volume of beer brewed in the US.  According to the Beer Institute's "Craft Brewers Conference Statistical Update - April 2007" (PPT), three brewers now supply 50% of the world's market and 80% of the US market.  See Figure 2, below. The Brewer's Association clarifies that only 5% of the volume of beer brewed in the US is from craft brewers, who manage to pull down a disproportionate 9% of revenues. (Conclusion: Small scale producers can command a premium in a commodity marketplace.)

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Figure 2.  US beer market share.  (Click on image for full-size.)

Here is an interesting question to which I do not have an answer: how much beer brewed by large producers is actually bottled and distributed locally?  "Lot's of beer", where I don't have any real idea of what "lot's" means, is produced via contract brewing.  It may be that "large scale production" is therefore not as centralized as it looks, but is rather the result of branding.  This makes some sense if you think about the cost of transportation.  As beer (regardless of its source) is mostly water, you are paying to ship something around that is usually plentiful at the destination.  It makes a lot of sense to manufacture locally.  But, as I say, I have yet to sort out the numbers.

Brewing as an Example of Distributed Biological Manufacturing

All of the above makes brewing an interesting test case for thinking about distributed biological production.  Craft brewers buy feedstocks like everybody else, pay for bottles and probably for bottling services, and ship their product just like everybody else.  They may be much smaller on average than Anheuser Busch, but they survive and by definition make enough money to keep their owners and employees happy.  And they keep their customers happy.  And their thirsts quenched.

Above, I identified two important conclusions about the craft brewing market relevant to this story: 1) Craft brewing emerged in the US amidst an already established large scale, industrial infrastructure for producing and distributing beer.  2) Small scale, distributed production can command a premium at the cash register.

As we look forward to future growth in the bioeconomy, more industrial production will be replaced by biofactories, or perhaps "industrial biorefineries", whatever those are supposed to be.  Recall that the genetically modified domestic product (GMDP) now contributes about 2% of total US GDP, with the largest share for industrial products.

This story becomes particularly relevant for companies like Blue Marble, which is already producing high value, drop-in replacements for petrochemicals using biological systems.  (Full disclosure: Blue Mable and Biodesic are collaborating on several projects.)  As feedstocks, Blue Marble uses local waste agricultural products, macro- and micro-algae, sewage, and -- wait for it -- spent grains from the microbrewery next door.  (How's that for closing the loop?)  Products include various solvents, flavorings, and scents.

The craft brewing story tells us that consumers are quite willing to pay a premium for locally produced, high quality products, even before they learn -- in the case of Blue Marble -- that the product is organic and petroleum-free.  It also tells us that small scale production can emerge even amidst an existing large industry. 

Can Blue Mable and other companies compete against enormous, established chemical and petroleum companies?  In my experience, the guys (and they are nearly universally guys) at the top of the oil industry don't even get this question.  "It is all about steel in the ground", they say.  In other words, they are competing based on the massive scale of their capital investments and the massive scale of their operations and they don't think anybody can touch them.

But here is the thing -- Blue Marble and similar companies are going to be producing at whatever scale makes sense.  Buildings, neighborhoods, cities, whatever.  Any technology that is based on cow digestion doesn't have to be any bigger than a cow.  Need more production?  Add more cows.  This costs rather less than adding another supertanker or another refinery.  Blue Marble just doesn't require massive infrastructure, in large part because they don't require petroleum as a feedstock and are not dependent on high temperatures for processing.  Most of the time, Blue Marble can do their processing in plastic jugs sitting on the floor, and stainless steel only comes into the picture for food-grade production lines.  This means capital costs are much, much lower.  This is a point of departure for biomanufacturing when compared to brewing.

(Update: Perusing old posts, I discovered I did a decent job last year of putting this scale argument in the context of both computers and the oil industry, here.)

Beer is close to a commodity product, and it is the small scale producers who get a better price, even though their costs will be roughly the same as large scale producers.  Blue Marble generally has substantially higher margins than petrochemical producers -- and by focusing on the high margin portion of the petroleum barrel they are going to be stealing the cream away from much larger companies -- but Blue Marble's costs are much lower.  What is the financial situation of a large petrochemical company going to look like when they lose the market for esters, which can have margins of many hundreds of dollars per liter, and are left with margins on products closer to gas and diesel at dollars per liter?  This is a different sort of play than you would see in brewing.

Now, I am not guaranteeing that distributed biological production will win in all cases.  Large beer brewers clearly still dominate their market.   It may be that biological manufacturing will look like the current beer industry; a few large players producing large volumes, and a large number of small players producing much less but at higher margins.  But craft brewing is nonetheless an existence proof that small scale, distributed production can emerge and thrive even amidst established large scale competition.  And biological manufacturing is sufficiently different from anything else we have experience with that the present market size of craft brewing may not be that relevant to other products. 

Shell and Recent Biofuels Moves

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According to the Financial Times, Shell recently entered a $12 billion deal with Cosan, the Brazilian sugar and ethanol producer.  Included in the deal are Shell's stakes in Iogen and Codexis, which together have a bunch of potent biological technologies useful for turning sugar and celluose into biofuels.  This represents a shift in strategy towards the biological production of fuels and away from industrial chemistry.  Last fall Shell sold off its stake in Choren, which had an advanced biomass-to-liquids program based on gasification of just about anything.  I met a group of executives from Choren at a meeting in Alberta about 18 months ago, and they seemed on top of the world with the partnership from Shell supporting their feedstock agnostic process.

It is interesting that Shell decided to change directions like this.  In the last couple of years I've heard many chemical engineers (including some from Shell) suggest that many of the problems plaguing process development in gasification and catalytic fuel synthesis were getting solved.  The story we told at Bio-era, and that I developed further in the book, is that industrial chemistry  would be one of many routes to biofuels, but that they might compete poorly in the long run because they require such careful tuning.  So Shell's exit might have been predicted at some point, but it came much sooner than I thought.  It appears biological technologies may appear a better bet even at this early stage.

25% of US Grain Crop Used for Biofuel

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The Guardian UK reported today that 2009 USDA figures show 25% of grains grown in the US were used to produce liquid biofuels.  The typical food vs fuel story follows.  And it is mostly on point, if tinted by The Guardian's usual populist tone.  Yes, all the grain could in principle be used to feed people.  No, it isn't clear that grain-based ethanol is in fact better than burning petroleum when it comes to total greenhouse gas emissions or energy content.

The story ends with a nod toward "continued innovation in ethanol product" that supposedly is increasing yields and reducing costs.  Huh.  No mention, though, of the fact that any starch crop used to make fuel starts at a major disadvantage with respect to sugar crops, nor that there is an ethanol glut in the US due to construction of too many ethanol production plants.  Neither does the story get into why ethanol isn't a very good fuel to begin with (wrong solvent properties, low energy content, water soluble).

I go into detail about this in my forthcoming book, but the upshot of the argument is that the US is investing quite a lot of money in ethanol production technology and infrastructure that will never be competitive with sugar derived fuels.  And then relatively soon we will get butanol, longer chain alcohols, and true drop-in petroleum replacements made using modified organisms.  In the meantime, I suppose we will just have to suffer through the impact of decisions made more for political reasons than for competitive or national security reasons.  But grain to ethanol isn't really good for anybody except US Senators from farm states.
I have a short letter in the November 2009 issue of Nature Biotechnology (subscription req.) correcting the record on US revenues from genetically modified crops.  Based on USDA data for corn, soy, and cotton, revenues from the GM versions of those crops were about US$ 65 billion in 2008, rather than the widely misreported ~$4 billion.  The latter figure is in fact just from GM seed revenue.  I would put the total from all GM crops and seeds at $75-85 billion, though it isn't yet clear where GM sugar beets are going to come in.  Assuming US revenues are representative of global averages, then total worldwide revenues are probably north of $150 billion for crops and seeds together.

Below is a figure showing US yearly revenues from the three big crops, as well as the US annual total.  Note that although the GM fraction of each crop continues to grow (see the ISAAA report from 2008), prices fluctuate sufficiently from year to year that total revenues declined from 2007 to 2008.  Food and crop prices have come off their 2007 highs -- which cannot last given increasing demand around the world.  I would expect revenues to resume their climb in 2010.

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A fortnight ago the World Wildlife Fund released a report pushing industrial biotech as a way to increase efficiency and reduce carbon emissions.  Interesting.  Of course, industrial biotech doesn't necessarily require direct genetic modification, but the WWF must know that is an inevitable consequence of heading down this road.  More on this after I get a chance to read the report.
Last week The Economist ran an online debate considering the motion "Biofuels, not electricity, will power the car of the future".  I was privileged to be invited as a guest contributor along with Tim Searchinger of Princeton University.  The two primary "speakers" were Alan Shaw of Codexis and Sidney Goodman of Automotive Alliances.  Here is my contribution to the debate, in which I basically rejected the false dichotomy of the motion (the first two 'graphs follow):

The future of transportation power sources will not be restricted to "either/or". Rather, over the coming decades, the nature of transportation fuel will be characterised by a growing diversity. The power sources for the cars of the future will be determined by the needs those cars address.

Those needs will be set for the market by a wide range of factors. Political and economic pressures are likely to require reducing greenhouse gas emissions and overall energy use per trip. Individuals behind the wheel will seek to minimise costs. But there is no single fuel that simultaneously satisfies the requirements of carbon neutrality, rapid refuelling, high-energy density for medium- to long-range driving and low cost.
I find it interesting that the voting came down so heavily in favor of electricity as the "fuel" of the future.  I suppose the feasibility of widespread electric cars depends on what you mean by "future".  Two substantial technology shifts will have to occur before electric cars displace those running on liquid fuels, both of which will require decades and trillions.

First, for the next several decades, no country, including the US, is likely to have sufficient electricity generating resources and power distribution infrustructure to convert large numbers of automobiles to electric power.  We need to install all kinds of new transmission lines around the country to pull this off.  And if we want the electricity to be carbon neutral, we need to install vast amounts of wind and solar generating capacity.  I know Stewart Brand is now arguing for nuclear power as "clean energy", but that still doesn't make sense to me for basic economic reasons. (Aside: at a party a few months ago, I got Lowell Wood to admit that nuclear power can't be economically viable unless the original funders go bankrupt and you can buy the physical plant on the cheap after all the initial investment has been wiped out.  Sweet business model.)

Second, the energy density of batteries is far below that of liquid hydrocarbons.  (See the Ragone chart included in my contribution to The Economist debate.)  Batteries are likely to close the gap over the coming years, but long distance driving will be the domain of liquid fuels for many years to come.  Yes, battery changing stations are an interesting option (as demonstrated by Better Place), but it will take vast investment to build a network of such stations sufficient to replace (or even compete with) liquid fuels.  Plugging in to the existing grid will require many hours to charge the batteries, if only because running sufficient current through most existing wires (and the cars themselves) to recharge car batteries rapidly would melt those wires.  Yes, yes -- nanothis and nanothat promise to enable rapid recharging of batteries.  Someday.  'Til then, don't bother me with science fiction.  And even if those batteries do show up in the proverbial "3 to 5 year" time frame, charging them rapidly would still melt most household power systems.

In the long run, I expect that electric cars will eventually replace those powered by liquid fuels.  But in the mean time, liquid fuels will continue to dominate our economy.
While writing a proposal for a new project, I've had occasion to dig back into Moore's Law and its origins.  I wonder, now, whether I peeled back enough of the layers of the phenomenon in my book.  We so often hear about how more powerful computers are changing everything.  Usually the progress demonstrated by the semiconductor industry (and now, more generally, IT) is described as the result of some sort of technological determinism instead of as the result of a bunch of choices -- by people -- that produce the world we live in.  This is on my mind as I continue to ponder the recent failure of Codon Devices as a commercial enterprise.  In any event, here are a few notes and resources that I found compelling as I went back to reexamine Moore's Law.

What is Moore's Law?

First up is a 2003 article from Ars Technica that does a very nice job of explaining the why's and wherefore's: "Understanding Moore's Law".  The crispest statement within the original 1965 paper is "The number of transistors per chip that yields the minimum cost per transistor has increased at a rate of roughly a factor of two per year."  At it's very origins, Moore's Law emerged from a statement about cost, and economics, rather than strictly about technology.

I like this summary from the Ars Technica piece quite a lot:

Ultimately, the number of transistors per chip that makes up the low point of any year's curve is a combination of a few major factors (in order of decreasing impact):

  1. The maximum number of transistors per square inch, (or, alternately put, the size of the smallest transistor that our equipment can etch),
  2. The size of the wafer
  3. The average number of defects per square inch,
  4. The costs associated with producing multiple components (i.e. packaging costs, the costs of integrating multiple components onto a PCB, etc.)
In other words, it's complicated.  Notably, the article does not touch on any market-associated factors, such as demand and the financing of new fabs.

The Wiki on Moore's Law has some good information, but isn't very nuanced.

Next, here an excerpt from an interview Moore did with Charlie Rose in 2005:

Charlie Rose:     ...It is said, and tell me if it's right, that this was part of the assumptions built into the way Intel made it's projections. And therefore, because Intel did that, everybody else in the Silicon Valley, everybody else in the business did the same thing. So it achieved a power that was pervasive.

Gordon Moore:   That's true. It happened fairly gradually. It was generally recognized that these things were growing exponentially like that. Even the Semiconductor Industry Association put out a roadmap for the technology for the industry that took into account these exponential growths to see what research had to be done to make sure we could stay on that curve. So it's kind of become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Semiconductor technology has the peculiar characteristic that the next generation always makes things higher performance and cheaper - both. So if you're a generation behind the leading edge technology, you have both a cost disadvantage and a performance disadvantage. So it's a very non-competitive situation. So the companies all recognize they have to stay on this curve or get a little ahead of it.
Keeping up with 'the Law' is as much about the business model of the semiconductor industry as about anything else.  Growth for the sake of growth is an axiom of western capitalism, but it is actually a fundamental requirement for chipmakers.  Because the cost per transistor is expected to fall exponentially over time, you have to produce exponentially more transistors to maintain your margins and satisfy your investors.  Therefore, Intel set growth as a primary goal early on.  Everyone else had to follow, or be left by the wayside.  The following is from the recent Briefing in The Economist on the semiconductor industry:

...Even the biggest chipmakers must keep expanding. Intel today accounts for 82% of global microprocessor revenue and has annual revenues of $37.6 billion because it understood this long ago. In the early 1980s, when Intel was a $700m company--pretty big for the time--Andy Grove, once Intel's boss, notorious for his paranoia, was not satisfied. "He would run around and tell everybody that we have to get to $1 billion," recalls Andy Bryant, the firm's chief administrative officer. "He knew that you had to have a certain size to stay in business."

Grow, grow, grow

Intel still appears to stick to this mantra, and is using the crisis to outgrow its competitors. In February Paul Otellini, its chief executive, said it would speed up plans to move many of its fabs to a new, 32-nanometre process at a cost of $7 billion over the next two years. This, he said, would preserve about 7,000 high-wage jobs in America. The investment (as well as Nehalem, Intel's new superfast chip for servers, which was released on March 30th) will also make life even harder for AMD, Intel's biggest remaining rival in the market for PC-type processors.

AMD got out of the atoms business earlier this year by selling its fab operations to a sovereign wealth fund run by Abu Dhabi.  We shall see how they fare as a bits-only design firm, having sacrificed their ability to themselves push (and rely on) scale.

Where is Moore's Law Taking Us?

Here are a few other tidbits I found interesting:

Re the oft-forecast end of Moore's Law, here is Michael Kanellos at CNET grinning through his prose: "In a bit of magazine performance art, Red Herring ran a cover story on the death of Moore's Law in February--and subsequently went out of business."

And here is somebody's term paper (no disrespect there -- it is actually quite good, and is archived at Microsoft Research) quoting an interview with Carver Mead:

Carver Mead (now Gordon and Betty Moore Professor of Engineering and Applied Science at Caltech) states that Moore's Law "is really about people's belief system, it's not a law of physics, it's about human belief, and when people believe in something, they'll put energy behind it to make it come to pass." Mead offers a retrospective, yet philosophical explanation of how Moore's Law has been reinforced within the semiconductor community through "living it":

After it's [Moore's Law] happened long enough, people begin to talk about it in retrospect, and in retrospect it's really a curve that goes through some points and so it looks like a physical law and people talk about it that way. But actually if you're living it, which I am, then it doesn't feel like a physical law. It's really a thing about human activity, it's about vision, it's about what you're allowed to believe. Because people are really limited by their beliefs, they limit themselves by what they allow themselves to believe what is possible. So here's an example where Gordon [Moore], when he made this observation early on, he really gave us permission to believe that it would keep going. And so some of us went off and did some calculations about it and said, 'Yes, it can keep going'. And that then gave other people permission to believe it could keep going. And [after believing it] for the last two or three generations, 'maybe I can believe it for a couple more, even though I can't see how to get there'. . . The wonderful thing about [Moore's Law] is that it is not a static law, it forces everyone to live in a dynamic, evolving world.
So the actual pace of Moore's Law is about expectations, human behavior, and, not least, economics, but has relatively little to do with the cutting edge of technology or with technological limits.  Moore's Law as encapsulated by The Economist is about the scale necessary to stay alive in the semiconductor manufacturing business.  To bring this back to biological technologies, what does Moore's Law teach us about playing with DNA and proteins?  Peeling back the veneer of technological determinism enables us (forces us?) to examine how we got where we are today. 

A Few Meandering Thoughts About Biology

Intel makes chips because customers buy chips.  According to The Economist, a new chip fab now costs north of $6 billion.  Similarly, companies make stuff out of, and using, biology because people buy that stuff.  But nothing in biology, and certainly not a manufacturing plant, costs $6 billion.

Even a blockbuster drug, which could bring revenues in the range of $50-100 billion during its commercial lifetime, costs less than $1 billion to develop.  Scale wins in drug manufacturing because drugs require lots of testing, and require verifiable quality control during manufacturing, which costs serious money.

Scale wins in farming because you need...a farm.  Okay, that one is pretty obvious.  Commodities have low margins, and unless you can hitch your wagon to "eat local" or "organic" labels, you need scale (volume) to compete and survive.

But otherwise, it isn't obvious that there are substantial barriers to participating in the bio-economy.  Recalling that this is a hypothesis rather than an assertion, I'll venture back into biofuels to make more progress here.

Scale wins in the oil business because petroleum costs serious money to extract from the ground, because the costs of transporting that oil are reduced by playing a surface-to-volume game, and because thermodynamics dictates that big refineries are more efficient refineries.  It's all about "steel in the ground", as the oil executives say -- and in the deserts of the Middle East, and in the Straights of Malacca, etc.  But here is something interesting to ponder: oil production may have maxed out at about 90 million barrels a day (see this 2007 article in the FT, "Total chief warns on oil output").  There may be lots of oil in the ground around the world, but our ability to move it to market may be limited.  Last year's report from Bio-era, "The Big Squeeze", observed that since about 2006, the petroleum market has in fact relied on biofuels to supply volumes above the ~90 million per day mark.  This leads to an important consequence for distributed biofuel production that only recently penetrated my thick skull.

Below the 90 million barrel threshold, oil prices fall because supply will generally exceed demand (modulo games played by OPEC, Hugo Chavez, and speculators).  In that environment, biofuels have to compete against the scale of the petroleum markets, and margins on biofuels get squeezed as the price of oil falls.  However, above the 90 million per day threshold, prices start to rise rapidly (perhaps contributing to the recent spike, in addition to the actions of speculators).  In that environment, biofuels are competing not with petroleum, but with other biofuels.  What I mean is that large-scale biofuels operations may have an advantage when oil prices are low because large-scale producers -- particularly those making first-generation biofuels, like corn-based ethanol, that require lots of energy input -- can eke out a bit more margin through surface to volume issues and thermodynamics.  But as prices rise, both the energy to make those fuels and the energy to move those fuels to market get more expensive.  When the price of oil is high, smaller scale producers -- particularly those with lower capital requirements, as might come with direct production of fuels in microbes -- gain an advantage because they can be more flexible and have lower transportation costs (being closer to the consumer).  In this price-volume regime, petroleum production is maxed out and small scale biofuels producers are competing against other biofuels producers since they are the only source of additional supply (for materials, as well as fuels).

This is getting a bit far from Moore's Law -- the section heading does contain the phrase "meandering thoughts" -- I'll try to bring it back.  Whatever the origin of the trends, biological technologies appear to be the same sort of exponential driver for the economy as are semiconductors.  Chips, software, DNA sequencing and synthesis: all are infrastructure that contribute to increases in productivity and capability further along the value chain in the economy.  The cost of production for chips (especially the capital required for a fab) is rising.  The cost of production for biology is falling (even if that progress is uneven, as I observed in the post about Codon Devices).  It is generally becoming harder to participate in the chip business, and it is generally becoming easier to participate in the biology business.  Paraphrasing Carver Mead, Moore's Law became an organizing principal of an industry, and a driver of our economy, through human behavior rather than through technological predestination.  Biology, too, will only become a truly powerful and influential technology through human choices to develop and deploy that technology.  But access to both design tools and working systems will be much more distributed in biology than in hardware.  It is another matter whether we can learn to use synthetic biological systems to improve the human condition to the extent we have through relying on Moore's Law. 

Bloggingheads Conversation with Carl Zimmer

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Bloggingheads.tv has just posted the video of my conversation with Carl Zimmer, "Biology as Technology".

We covered quite a lot of ground.  Check it out and drop a comment or a note if you have a question.

"The New Biofactories"

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I have a short essay in a special edition of the McKinsey Quarterly, What Matters.  My piece is waaaay back at the end of the printed volume, and all the preceding articles are well worth a look.  Other essayists include Steven Chu, Hal Varian, Nicholas Stern, Kim Stanley Robinson, Yochai Benkler, Vinod Khosla, Arianna Huffington, Joseph Nye, and many more.  Good company.

Here is the link: "The New Biofactories", Robert Carlson, What Matters, McKinsey & Company, 2009.

Carl Zimmer on Synthetic Biology for Biofuels

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Carl Zimmer has a nice piece in Yale Enivronment360 on continued efforts to build bugs that produce fuel, "The High-Tech Search For A Cleaner Biofuel Alternative".  The article extensively quotes Steve Aldrich, President of Bio-era, on the trade-offs of using sugar cane as a source material.

Craig Venter makes an appearance arguing that the best long-term bet is to build photosynthetic bugs that use atomspheric CO2 to directly produce fuel.  Maybe.  This would require containment facilities for culturing engineered bugs, where those facilities also must capture sunlight and CO2 to feed the bugs.  The costs for this infrastructure are not insignificant, and this is exactly what is presently standing in the way of large scale algal biodiesel production.

Here is the question I keep asking in these circles: why not just grow naturally occurring algae, which can be grown at extremely high yield in a wide variety of conditions, as food for bugs hacked to eat cellulose?  If there is no algae to be had, just throw in another source of cellulose or other biomass.  There would be minimal concern over growing modified organisms that might escape into the wild.  The processing of biomass into fuel under would also be under conditions that are easier to optimize and control.

I'm not suggesting this is the only answer, but rather that it appears to balance 1) the costs of infrastructure, 2) concerns over enviromental release of genetically modified organisms, and 3) provide an efficient processing infrastructure that could use a wide variety of feedstocks.

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