The human cost of not producing inexpensive artemisinin in vats is astronomical. If reducing the burden of malaria around the world on almost 2 billion people might harm "a few thousand" farmers, then we should make sure those farmers can make a living growing some other crop. We can solve both problems. ...Just one year of 1.3% GDP growth recovered by reducing (eliminating?) the impact of malaria would more than offset paying wormwood farmers to grow something else. There is really no argument to do anything else.
Recently in Current Affairs Category
The Coming War Overhead
Are you ready for drone
dogfights? How about combat flocks and swarms? They are
coming. And they will be over your head before you know
it.
From my office window I am fortunate to often see
eagles and hawks in flight over Seattle's Lake Union. These raptors
are regularly harassed by smaller birds attempting to run off
potential predators or competitors. Each species - whether
predator and prey - clearly employs different tactics based on
size, speed, armaments, number of combatants, etc. Within a few
years this aerial combat will become a frequent sight in the U.S.,
but rather than raptors, crows, and gulls, the combatants will be
drones of all shapes and sizes. I am not at all sure that we
are adequately prepared, or whether we are adequately planning, for
the strange world ahead.
This battle will be engaged on many
different fronts. Left, right, black hat, white hat, criminal, law
enforcement: all will have the same tools at their disposal. Even if
federal, state, and local agencies have early access to hand-me down
technologies developed for military applications, they will be up
against a large number of innovators, many of whom come from
open-source, hacker communities where innovation runs faster than
anywhere else.
I have outlined the playing field (Quidditch pitch?) in prior installments. The capability to produce and hack drones is already widely distributed. Drones can now cooperate in swarms to build structures, play music, and play catch. Economic incentives - as well as the cool factor - strongly favor the development of ever less expensive and ever more capable drones to be used for photography, shipping, data storage, and communications, just to name a few applications. As drones and the services they provide become more valuable, and as they inevitably become useful for supplying illicit products such as drugs and pirated music and movies, attempts at regulating drone use are likely to increase demand. This is the very definition of 'perverse incentives'. Yet with the capability to produce drones already so democratized, the only way to limit their use is likely to be direct force. And thus the combat capabilities of even simple drones will, like printing, file-sharing, and every market for every illicit drug, become an arena of continual technological oneupmanship. Drone enthusiasts who work on national security issues have already started a "Drone Smackdown" tourney to explore tactics in their spare time.
So it isn't at all hard to imagine
that somewhere down this road we will see a mashup of cheap drones
and the sort of Shanzai
warfare recently seen in Libya, and now in Syria, in which
irregular forces hack together their own knock-off versions of much
more expensive (and much more capable) weapons systems they have
probably only seen on the Internet. But those DIY weapons systems
seem to have done the job. So, too, will Shanzai combat drones.
Here is what we can look forward to: projectiles, nets, lasers or LEDs to blind cameras, strings dropped or shot onto rotors, aerosol cans turned into flying flamethrowers, salt water spray, chaff to disrupt near-field or optical communications, and simple electronic jamming. And each offensive mode will breed countermeasures. The fruits of idle and motivated minds will germinate. Almost any cheap drone will probably have a spare servo circuit or two to control on-board munitions. Adding capacity will be trivial. Remember: many drones are already flying smart phones, so whatever the mission, there's an app for that (see Pt I).
There will be casualties in these
confrontations. The drones, certainly, will suffer. But
sometimes the countermeasures will miss, causing damage to whatever
and whomever is downrange. And when drones are successfully
destroyed, they will fall down. Onto things. And onto
people. Such as when a Sheriff's Department in Texas dropped
a big drone onto it's own SWAT team. Fortunately, the team was
sheltered inside their armored car; we should all be so lucky.
In
short, the drivers for an arms race are multifold: potential
invasion of privacy by government or commercial drones (see Pt.
III), attack and defense of file sharing swarms, attacks on (or
hijacking of) and defense of cargo drones. As costs fall, and
capabilities improve, novel applications will emerge that will in
turn drive ever more innovation in drone weapons systems, especially
in countermeasures.
Regardless of what the rules are, of what the FAA and other authorities decide to allow, the economic incentives to employ drones as I have described above will drive behavior. There are just no two ways about it. We will be seeing some version of the world I have described in this series of posts. Consequently, any regulatory should facilitate the safe use of drones rather than attempt to constrain their use. What troubles me, and what motivated me to explore this topic, is that ongoing discussions of drone regulations will completely miss both the economic drivers and the technological ferment making it all possible. I'd like to be wrong about that, but history is likely to be an excellent guide. In the case of drones, as in every other attempt to regulate a democratized technology that serves a large and growing market, black markets will emerge. Nefarious applications of drones are inevitable, and poorly conceived regulation will be an accelerant that makes the problem worse. This is not an argument that all regulation is bad, merely an argument that regulation will be as poorly considered and poorly applied to drones as it was in all the other technological cases I have studied.
Finally, we must remember, first and foremost, that humans will continue to be the targets of armed drones wherever they fly. And, like the raptors that inspired me to think about drone combat, U.S. innovations in arming drones will come home to roost. That is the world we should be preparing for; have no illusions otherwise.
(Pt I, Drones for Destruction, Construction, and Distribution; Pt II, Pirate Hunting in the Clouds)
Photos, Bullets, and Smuggling
Unmanned
aerial photography drones look to be the next big thing. They also
look to be highly annoying and invasive. Earlier this year, the New
York Times described a Los Angeles drone operator who had
already been approached by paparazzi to take photos of celebrities.
Until regulatory issues got in the way, his previous job was in
aerial real-estate photography, where there is also big demand. The
Times article describes how the FAA must decide on rules for
commercial drone use in aerial photography, among many other
applications, by 2015. But it is the paparazzi gig that should get
you thinking.
The reason the paparazzi take photos of famous
people is money. Famous people have money, and notoriety, and
other people for some reason pay to peek in their windows and,
frankly, up their skirts. What is going to happen when
paparazzi
start to use drones? Let's call these robots dronarazzi.
(According to Wikipedia, the word paparazzi
comes from Fellini's La
Dolce Vita and is meant to suggest an annoying, buzzing,
insect. My neologism may be superfluous given the racket
current drones make, but it seems important to distinguish between
humans and drones, don't you think?) Very quickly after
dronarazzi appear, famous people will attempt to use their money to
get laws passed against them. Those laws will turn out to be
unenforceable due to the profusion of hardware so cheap that it is
disposable. Famous, wealthy people will then spend some of
their money to physically remove the annoyance of the dronarazzi.
And there it begins: drone countermeasures.
Drones have
already been the subject of armed confrontation within U.S. borders.
Recently, hunters in Texas unhappy about a surveillance drone flown
by animal rights activists proceeded
to pretend it was a game bird. The shoot-down was likely
illegal;
undoubtedly lawsuits are afoot. As more drones take to the sky,
there will certainly be more such confrontations. Surveillance
drones flown by law enforcement agencies, the DEA, and U.S.
Customs will certainly be targets. Even before law
enforcement agencies find themselves involved in daily skirmishes we
will see countermeasures innovations crop up in -- no surprise here
-- California. Hollywood, to be specific. I would expect the
first dronarazzi shoot-downs to happen fairly soon, even before the
FAA sorts out the relevant regulations. And given how frequently
paparazzi crash their cars into each other, their subjects, and
bystanders, we can expect dronarazzi to cause analogous physical
damage.
But look ahead just a bit, beyond photography, to a
time when drones are providing real-time traffic or crowd monitoring,
perhaps combined with face recognition, which you, the surveilled,
may not want to allow. What will the market look like for
gizmos that prevent airborne cameras from imaging your face? Or
what about when small, VTOL drones are actually moving stuff around
in the real world. That stuff could conceivably be your latest,
packet-switched delivery from Amazon, or it could be the latest
methamphetamine delivery from your drug dealer; it will be hard to
tell the difference without physical inspection. Law
enforcement will want to track -- and almost certainly to inspect --
those cargoes, and many a sender and recipient will want to thwart
both tracking and inspection.
The rules for drone flight set
by the FAA will probably attempt to spell out specific allowed uses.
This decision will be informed both by 9/11 and by recent U.S. combat
experience. We might see the definition of specific drone flight
corridors, or specific drone flight characteristics, and federal,
state, and local authorities may demand the ability to override the
controls on drones through back doors in software. But those
back doors will be vulnerable to misuse, and are likely to be nailed
shut even by above-board drone operators. Who wants to loose
control of a drone to the hacker kid next door? And, obviously, the
economic incentive to cheat in the face of any drone flight or
construction regulations will be absolutely enormous. Many
people will make the calculation (probably correctly) that, in the
unlikely event that a suspect drone itself is caught or disabled, the
operator will walk away scot-free because it simply may not be
possible to identify her. Yet I suspect that whatever the rules
forwarded by the FAA, and whatever powers of intervention in drone
activity are given to law enforcement, that it will all come down to
whether people can be physically prevented from doing what
they want with drones. That is, can drone flight rules actually
be enforced without the hands-on ability to capture or shut down
scofflaw drones and operators? The answer, very likely, is no,
especially given the existing community of drone hackers who are
proficient at producing both hardware and software. This brings us
back to the proliferation of physical and electronic
countermeasures. And I question whether we are adequately
planning for the future.
(Coming soon, Part IV: The Coming War Overhead)
(Pt 1, Drones for Destruction, Construction, and Distribution)
Pirate Hunting in the
Clouds
Piracy is a perennial weed. For example,
coordinated efforts to shut down electronic file sharing have had
little effect; you can still find anything you want online. The
reason, of course, is that pirate hunters are always playing catchup
to technological innovation that facilitates the anonymous
movement of bits. That should be no surprise to anyone
involved, because the same sort of technological struggle has been
present in print piracy since
the days of Johannes Gutenberg. Music, game, and movie piracy is just the same game on a new field.
The latest innovation in
file sharing looks to be drones. Two groups, The
Pirate Bay (TPB) and Electronic
Countermeasures, are building swarms of file-sharing drones meant
to decentralize information storage and communications. TPB, in
particular, propounds an ideology of sharing everything they can get
their hands on by any means available. Says one contributor,
"Everyone knows WHAT TPB is. Now they're going to have to think
about WHERE TPB is." File sharing may soon be located both
metaphorically and physically in the clouds.
How will
pirate-hunters respond to airborne, file-sharing drones? Attempts will certainly be made to regulate airborne networks.
But that approach will probably fail, because regulation rarely makes headway
against ideology. Along with regulation will come electronic
efforts to disrupt drone networks by jamming broadcasts and
disrupting intraswarm communications. That is likely to fail as
well, because the drone networks will employ frequency bands used for
many other devices, which will make drone-specific jamming
technologically implausible, especially in signal-rich, urban
environments. Finally, both government and industry will embark
on physically attacking the drones (to which I return to in a
moment). But that isn't going to work either, because drones
will soon be cheap enough to fire and forget.
At the moment,
the hardware for each of the file-sharing drones is a bit pricy,
north of $1000. Inevitably, the cost will come down.
Quite capable toy quadcopters are available for only a few hundred
dollars, whereas just a few years ago the same bird cost thousands.
You can be sure that other form factors will be used, too.
Fixed-wing and lighter-than-air drones are experiencing the same
pressure for innovation as four-, six-, and eight-bladed 'copters.
Regardless of what sort of drones are employed in the network, any
concerted effort to physically disrupt drones will simply result in
more innovation and cost reduction by those who want to keep them in
the air. The economic motivation to fly drones in the face of
regulations is compelling, whether for smuggling atoms or bits, and
as a result there is every reason to think there will be clouds of
drones in the air relatively soon.
As we start down this road,
what's missing from the conversation is a concerted effort to ask,
"What's next?" Authorities might imagine they can
constrain access to the physical hardware, but the manufacturing of
drones is already well beyond anyone's control. Any attempt at restricting access or use will merely create perverse incentives for greater innovation.
Hackers
regularly modify
commercially available drones to their own ends. Beyond
what comes in a kit, structural
components for drones can be 3D-printed, with open source CAD
files and parts lists available
at Thingverse and other repositories. Whatever mechanical
parts (such as propellers) that are not now easily printable will
undoubtedly soon be, and in any case can be easily molded in a
variety of plastics. MIT just announced a project to develop
printable robots. While the MIT paper 'bots are described
as being terrestrial, you have to imagine that boffins are already
cooking up aerial versions. Contributing to the air of
innovation, DARPA even runs a crowd-sourced UAV design competition,
UAVForge.
So much for the hardware; what about control software? The University of Pennsylvania's Vijay Kumar and his collaborators at the GRASP Lab literally have drones jumping through hoops on command, and cooperating both to fly in formation and to build large structures. This academic project will certainly result in the publication of papers describing the relevant control algorithms, and quite probably the publication of the control code itself. Imagining GRASP Lab projects out in the wild gives you something to think about. When you put all this together, the combination of distributed designs and distributed manufacturing employing readily available motors and drive electronics mean that, in the words of open source advocate Bruce Perens, "innovation has gone public". (For more on that meme, see Perens' The Emerging Economic Paradigm of Open Source.) As a result, there is no physical means available to law enforcement, or to anyone else, to either control access to drones or to control their use. Combining wide access to hardware with inevitably open-source control code will produce a profusion of drone swarms. And yet some authorities will inevitably try to restrict access and use of drones, both in the name of public safety and to maintain a technological edge over putative scofflaws. Up next: what if attempts at regulation just make things worse?
Drones for Destruction, Construction, and
Distribution
Drones, it seems, are everywhere. The news
is full of the rapidly expanding use of drones in combat. The U.S.
government uses drones daily to gather intelligence and to
kill people. Other organizations, ranging from organized militaries
in China, Israel, and Iran to militias like Hezbollah, aspire to
possess similar capabilities. Amateurs are in the thick of it, too;
if a recent online video is to be believed, a few months of effort is
all that is necessary to develop a
DIY drone capable of deploying DIY antipersonnel ordinance.
Lest
we think drones are only used to create mayhem, they are used to
create beauty. Last year's lovely art project Flight
Assembled Architecture employed a centrally-controlled swarm
of small drones to build a complex, curving tower 6 meters tall.
Operating in a highly controlled environment, fully outfitted with
navigational aides, each drone had to position itself precisely in
six degrees of freedom (three in space, and three in rotation) in
order to place each building block. As our urban areas become
sensor-rich environments, drones will soon have these remarkable
navigational capabilities just about anywhere people live at high
densities, namely urban environments.
To understand the future capabilities of drones, you need merely think of them as flying smartphones running apps. That's not a great leap, because smartphones are already used as the brains for some drones. The availability of standard iPhones and Android phones has enabled a thriving market of third-party apps that provide ever new capabilities to the user. Drone platforms will benefit from analogous app development. Moreover, as hardware improves, so will the capabilities of apps. For example, Broadcom recently announced a new chip that enables the integration of multiple kinds of signals -- GPS, magnetometer, altimeter, wi-fi, cell phone tower, gyroscopes, etc. -- and that "promises to indicate location ultra-precisely, possibly within a few centimeters, vertically and horizontally, indoors and out." The advertised application of that chip is for cell phones, but you can be sure the chips will find their way into drones, if only via cell phones, and will then quickly be utilized by guidance apps. Whatever the drone mission may be, there will be an app for that.
When those individual, sensor-laden
drones can cooperate, things get even more interesting. Vijay
Kumar's recent TED
talk has must-see video of coordinated swarms of quad-rotor
drones. The drones, built at the GRASP
Lab at the University of Pennsylvania, fly in formation, map
outdoor and indoor environments, and as an ensemble play music on
oversized instruments (see Double-O-Drone).
As you watch the videos, pay close attention to how well the drones
understand their own position and speed, and how that information
improves their flight capabilities. When equipped with GPS and
other sorts of sensors, drones are clearly capable of not just
finding their way around complex environments but also of
manipulating those environments. At the moment, the drones'
brains are actually in a stationary computer, with both sensory data
and flight instructions wirelessly broadcast to and fro.
Moore's Law guarantees that those brains - including derivatives of
the aforementioned Broadcom chip - will soon reside on the drones,
thereby enabling real-time, local control, which will be necessary
for autonomous operations at any real distance from home base.
The drones will become birds. But these birds will have
vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) capabilities, substantial
load-carrying capacity, and will be able to work together towards
ends set by humans.
A company called Matternet
is already planning to exploit these capabilities. The
company's initial business model involves transporting goods in
developing countries that lack adequate infrastructure. If this
strategy is successful, and if it can be scaled up, it will negate
the need to build much of the fixed infrastructure that exists in the
developed world. It is a 21st century version of the Pony
Express: think packet-switching, which makes the internet work
efficiently, but for atoms rather than for bits.
Matternet
plans that the first goods moved this way will be small, high value,
perishables like pharmaceuticals. But cargo size needn't be
limited. As Vijay Kumar pointed out in his TED talk, drones can
cooperate to lift and transport larger objects. While
undoubtedly power or fuel will constrain some of these plans until
technology catches up to aspirations, drones will inevitably be used
to move larger and larger objects over longer and longer distances.
The technology will also be used very soon in the U.S. The FAA
has
been directed to come up with rules for commercial drone use by
2015, and must sort out how to enable emergency agencies to use
drones in 2012. There are already 61
organizations in the U.S. with permission to fly drones in civilian
airspace. Yet rather less thought has been given to drone
use outside the rules. We are planning for drones, after a fashion,
but what about after they arrive?
(Part II: Pirate Hunting in the Clouds)
My own motivation for doing this work is to better understand what is going on in the world. When it comes to developing policy to improve security and safety, I unapologetically insist that data drive policy. There are far too many people who develop policy in spite of data rather than in light of data. That leads to messy thinking and demonstrably makes us less safe and less secure. All that said, one conclusion from my work on this report is that nobody is doing a very good job of gathering and publishing the data necessary to understand the rapid technical and economic development of biotechnology around the world.
One final thought about the report: this particular document was funded by the U.S. government, and I was given a particular set of charges in the task (see pg iii-iv); the report is therefore tilted toward U.S. security concerns. However, the basic analyses and conclusions are relevant to developing policy in any country, and for that matter to developing strategy for many private companies and other organizations. I will continue work on this story, and look forward to engaging people around the globe in better understanding how our world is changing.
Here is the "Background" section of the report. Please note that the report is now a few years old, and the bioeconomy has continued to grow rapidly around the world.
Biotechnology is becoming increasingly de-skilled and less expensive, leading to a proliferation of localized innovation around the world. In addition to major investments by growing economic powerhouses India and China, other developing countries such as Indonesia, Pakistan, and Brazil are equally intent on developing domestic biotech research and development capabilities. All of these countries are interested initially in producing drugs for diseases that predominantly affect their citizens, a project that requires a particular infrastructure and set of skills. Yet those same skills can be used to develop other applications, from fuels and materials to weapons, all of which can serve as a lever to increase power and presence on the world stage, thereby enabling developing countries to become rivals to the US both regionally and globally.
Economic demand will serve as a driver for ever greater proliferation of biotechnology. Today, in the US, revenues from genetically modified systems contribute the equivalent of almost 2% of GDP, and are growing in the range of 15 to 20% per year. China, among other countries, is not far behind and is following explicit government policy to substantially increase its independent, domestic development of new biological technologies to address such diverse concerns as healthcare, biomass production, and biomanufacturing. As is already the case in many other industries, trade between developing nations in biotech may soon exceed trade with the US. Therefore, among the challenges the US is likely to face in this environment is that the flow of technology, ideas, and skills may bypass US soil. Moreover, because skills and instrumentation are widely available, biotechnological development is possible in unconventional settings outside of universities and corporate laboratories. The resulting profusion of localized and distributed innovation is likely to provide a wide variety of challenges to US security, from economic competition, to intelligence gathering, to the production of new bio-threats.
And here is a video summary of the first day, with me enthusing about PICNIC, one of my favorite communities.
For background, see my earlier post "Censoring Science is Detrimental to Security".
As most readers of this blog know, there has been quite a furor over new results demonstrating mutations in H5N1 influenza strains that are both deadly and highly contagious in mammals. Two groups, led by Ron Fouchier in the The Netherlands and Yoshihiro Kawaoka at The University of Wisconsin, have submitted papers to Nature and Science describing the results. The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) has requested that some details, such as sequence information, be omitted from publication. According to Nature, both journals are "reserving judgement about whether to censor the papers until the US government provides details of how it will allow genuine researchers to obtain redacted information".
For those looking to find more details about what happened, I suggest starting with Dorveen Caraval's interview with Fouchier in the New York Times, "Security in Flu Study Was Paramount, Scientist Says"; Kathleen Harmon's firsthand account of what actually happened when the study was announced; and Heidi Ledford's post at Nature News about the NSABB's concerns.
If you want to go further, there is more good commentary, especially the conversation in the comments (including from a member of the NSABB), in "A bad day for science" by Vincent Racaniello. See also Michael Eisen's post "Stop the presses! H5N1 Frankenflu is going to kill us all!", keeping in mind that Eisen used to work on the flu.
Writing at Foreign Policy, Laurie Garrett has done some nice reporting on these events in two posts, "The Bioterrorist Next Door" and "Flu Season". She suggests that attempts to censor the results would be futile: "The genie is out of the bottle: Eager graduate students in virology departments from Boston to Bangkok have convened journal-review debates reckoning exactly how these viral Frankenstein efforts were carried out."
There is much I agree with in Ms. Garrett's posts. However, I must object to her assertion that the work done by Fouchier and Kawaoka can be repeated easily using the tools of synthetic biology. She writes "The Fouchier episode laid bare the emptiness of biological-weapons prevention programs on the global, national, and local levels. Along with several older studies that are now garnering fresh attention, it has revealed that the political world is completely unprepared for the synthetic-biology revolution." As I have already written a book that discusses this confusion (here is an excerpt about synthetic biology and the influenza virus), it is not actually what I want to write about today. But I have to get this issue out of the way first.
As far as I understand from reading the press accounts, both groups used various means to create mutations in the flu genome and then selected viruses with properties they wanted to study. To clarify, from what I have been able to glean from the sparse accounts thus far, DNA synthesis was not used in the work. And as far as I understand from reading the literature and talking to people who build viruses for a living, it is still very hard to assemble a functioning, infectious influenza virus from scratch.
If it were easy to write pathogen genomes -- particularly flu genomes -- from scratch, we would quite frankly be in deep shit. But, for the time being, it is hard. And that is important. Labs who do use synthetic biology to build influenza viruses, as with those who reconstructed the 1918 H1N1 influenza virus, fail most of the time despite great skill and funding. Synthesizing flu viruses is simply not a garage activity. And with that, I'll move on.
Regardless of how the results might be reproduced, many have suggested that the particular experiments described by Fouchier and Kawaoka should not have been allowed. Fouchier himself acknowledges that selecting for airborne viruses was not the wisest experiment he could have done; it was, he says, "really, really stupid". But the work is done, and people do know about it. So the question of whether this work should have been done in the first place is beside the point. If, as suggested by Michael Eisen, that "any decent molecular biologist" could repeat the work, then it was too late to censor the details as soon as the initial report came out.
I am more interested in the consequences of trying to contain the results while somehow allowing access to vetted individuals. Containing the results is as much about information security as it is biological security. Once such information is created, the challenge is to protect it, to secure it. Unfortunately, the proposal to allow secure access only by particular individuals is at least a decade (if not three decades) out of date.
Any attempt to secure the data would have to start with an assessment of how widely it is already distributed. I have yet to meet an academic who regularly encrypts email, and my suspicion is that few avail themselves of the built-in encryption on their laptops. So, in addition to the university computers and email servers where the science originated, the information is sitting in the computers of reviewers, on servers at Nature and Science, at the NSABB, and, depending on how the papers were distributed and discussed by members of the NSABB, possibly on their various email servers and individual computers as well. And let's not forget the various unencrypted phones and tablets all of those reviewers now carry around.
But never mind that for a moment. Let's assume that all these repositories of the relevant data are actually secure. The next step is to arrange access for selected researchers. That access would inevitably be electronic, requiring secure networks, passwords, etc. In the last few days the news has brought word that computer security firms Stratfor and Symantec have evidently been hacked recently. Such attacks are not uncommon. Think back over the last couple of years: hacks at Google, various government agencies, universities. Credit card numbers, identities, and supposedly secret DoD documents are all for sale on the web. To that valuable information we can now add a certain list of influenza mutations. If those mutations are truly a critical biosecurity risk -- as asserted publicly by various members of the NSABB -- then that data has value far beyond its utility in virology and vaccinology.
The behavior of various hackers (governments, individuals, other) over the last few years make clear that what the discussion thus far has done is to stick a giant "HACK HERE" sign on the data. Moreover, if Ms. Garrett is correct that students across the planet are busy reverse engineering the experiments because they don't have access to the original methods and data, then censorship is creating a perverse incentive for innovation. Given today's widespread communication, restriction of access to data is an invitation, not a proscription.
This same fate awaits any concentration of valuable data. It obviously isn't a problem limited to collections of sensitive genetic sequences or laboratory methods. And there is certainly a case to be made for attempting to maintain confidential or secret caches of data, whether in the public or private interest. In such instances, compartmentalization and encryption must be implemented at the earliest stages of communication in order to have any hope of maintaining security.
However, in this case, if it true that reverse engineering the results is straightforward, then restriction of access serves only to slow down the general process of science. Moreover, censorship will slow the development of countermeasures. It is unlikely that any collection of scientists identified by the NSABB or the government will be sufficient to develop all the technology we need to respond to natural pathogens, let alone any artificial ones.
As with most other examples of prohibition, these restrictions are doomed before they are even implemented. Censorship of information that is known to exist incentivizes innovation and rediscovery. As I explored in my book, prohibition in the name of security is historically a losing proposition. Moreover, science is inherently a networked human activity that is fundamentally incompatible with constraints on communication, particularly of results that are already disclosed. Any endeavor that relies upon science is, therefore, also fundamentally incompatible with constraints on communication. Namely developing technologies to defend against natural and artificial pathogens. Censorship threatens not just science but also our security.