Where Should We Look For Biofuels?

The Press is full of reports describing the investment boom in biofuels.  So much hoopla.  The problem is that not all biofuels are the same, and some of them will apparently do more harm than good. 

Bio Economic Research Associates has studied the alternatives quite intensely, and now that "Genome Synthesis and Design Futures" is published we are examining more closely where Synthetic Biology fits into the biofuels picture.  More broadly, we are now exploring not just the technological angles, but also the economic and social costs built into choices about what crops to use for biofuels, where and how to grow those plants, and what happens to carbon emissions under the various options.

Vinod Khosla laid out his views in Wired last fall with "My Big Biofuels Bet", describing a plan to reduce carbon emissions and reduce reliance on imported oil, with all the best of intentions.  And here is a story from the AP (via Wired) "Betting on a Green Future", that appeared "way back" in April, 2006.  It's easy to find articles on biofuels in every major (and minor) news outlet, in big and small scientific journals, and of course in blogs.  Money is chasing opportunities in ethanol fermented from corn and straw, biodiesel from soy and palm, various liquid fuels produced from animal and plant biomass via Fischer-Tropsch or similar processes, methane from manure and garbage heaps, all the way through genetically modified plants that either directly produce fuels or are easier to process into fuels, to direct production of liquid biofuels using microbes modified with the tools of Synthetic Biology.  Venture Capitalists were as prominent as biologists and engineers at Synthetic Biology 2.0 last year in Berkeley.

Very interesting and promising stuff indeed.  But perhaps not so well thought through as it needs to be.  For example, the last couple of days have seen a profusion of articles on carbon release from land in Indonesia and Malaysia cleared for growing oil palms destined for use as biodiesel.  Here is an excellent story from the AP, via the IHT, that carries the title, "Energy companies rethink palm oil as biofuel":

A report late last year by a Netherlands-based research group claimed some plantations produce far more carbon dioxide than they save. Seeded on drained peat swamps, they unleash a warehouse of carbon from decomposed plants and animals that had been locked in the bogs for hundreds of million years, which one biologist described as "buried sunshine."

"As a biofuel, it's a failure," said Marcel Silvius, a climate change expert for Wetlands International, the institute that led the research team.

The story does note that, "Wetlands' figures could not be independently verified by the U.N. Climate Change Secretariat in Bonn, Germany, by the World Resources Institute in Washington, D.C., nor by academic experts. But all said the research appeared credible."

Companies that produce and consume palm oil are hoping that a trusted trading scheme can be set up to ensure oil comes from sustainable sources:

With concerns mounting over sourcing, plantation owners joined forces with processors, investors and environmentalists three years ago to form the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil with the aim of monitoring the industry and drawing up criteria for socially responsible trade. But the RSPO has yet to create a foolproof system to verify the supply chain.

I have serious doubts about whether any such system is possible.  Given the fungibility of the palm oil, just as with petroleum, I wonder whether it will be possible to keep track of sources, particularly if the oil is consolidated or mixed during harvesting, processing, and shipping.  It only gets worse once the raw palm oil is converted into higher value diesel fuel

The size of the potential carbon release from peat and rain forest cleared for growing biofuels is so large that biodiesel use could easily run afoul of carbon caps being considered in Europe, Japan, Canada, and perhaps eventually the U.S.  Given how lucrative the plant oil market is becoming, there will be plenty of incentives for cheating on the supply side, as is now happening with sugar cane production in Brazil.  I don't see an easy technological fix for tracking sugar, ethanol, palm oil, or biodiesel, so I don't understand where any sort of lever will be useful for suppressing the emergence of a black market as plants become fuel.  It seems to me that there could be significant costs associated with verification, tracking, and perhaps certification, of sources, and I suspect this will have a big effect on plans for importing and processing oil.  Not only are the direct economic costs something to consider, but the social and public relations impacts could be substantial.  Indeed, the latter are affecting decision making already.  From the IHT:

"We spent more than a year investigating the sustainability issues with palm oil," said Leon Flexman, of RWE npower, Britain's largest electricity supplier. The company decided against palm oil because it could not verify all its supplies would be free of the taint of destroyed rain forest or peat bogs, he said.

Beyond the effects on carbon emissions, converting crops into biofuels fundamentally impacts food supplies.  Not to mention all the water that will be required to irrigate crops grown using modern farming methods.  George Monbiot, writing at The Guardian, makes a surprisingly good (for The Guardian) argument for a moratorium on governmental targets and incentives for biofuel use.  Monbiot cites all sorts of gloomy facts and figures regarding the climate effects and market impacts of using food crops as fuel, and of clearing rain forest to grow sugar cane or oil palms.

An altogether different set of problems arises when you start examining the prospects for biofuels produced from genetically modified versions of food crops.  While leakage of genes from GM crops into their un-modified cousins is still a hypothetical danger, there is a very real and immediate possibility of governmental regulations that limit planting.  Here, for example, is an interesting collection of stories about GM crops, leakage, and policy from gepolicyalliance.com.  With recent examples of pharmaceutically-modified rice and corn finding their way into the food supply, some farm state congressmen are wondering aloud about legislation to limit the planting of such crops.

So it makes sense to think ahead about the effects on biofuels.  In a long and detailed letter published last month in Nature Biotechnology under the title, "Biofuels and biocontainment", C. Neal Foster at the University of Tennessee, writes:

It is difficult to imagine that transgenic technologies will not be pivotal in transforming the process of going from grass to gas, in particular enhancing the production of lignocellulosic-based plant feedstock and its conversion into ethanol or biodiesel. Although biotech has an opportunity to increase yields and efficiency of bioenergy crop production as well as aid the conversion of complex carbohydrates and plant oils to fuels, unless modifications are performed with an eye to meet future regulatory and consumer issues, these potential benefits might never be realized.

...On the regulatory side, history has shown that it is nearly impossible to prevent industrial or pharmaceutical crops from entering the human food chain or feed when grown in proximity to one another. Low levels of adventitious presence of agronomic traits have been tolerated to some degree, but there is less tolerance for pharmaceutical and industrial transgene adventitious presence in the food chain.

...Because large tracts of land will likely be planted in bioenergy crops, there are important ecological considerations for sustainability. We need to prepare now to detour obvious roadblocks on the road to biofuels sustainability. One enduring lesson from agricultural biotech is that it is a huge mistake to underestimate biosafety concerns. A corollary is that Nature will always find a way; Murphy's law implies that no matter how unlikely it seems that genes will flow, they eventually will.

Foster explores the various options for GM food crops and non-food crops, and the rest of the letter is well worth reading.  Given the recent decision by a federal judge that the USDA was negligent in approving GM alfalfa without greater study (here is the press release from the Center for Food Safety), it is clear that open planting of GM crops may not be as easy in the future.  But there are other possibilities for high-yield biofuel production from plants.

One potentially less controversial source of biofuels, at least for North America, is to use non-GM, native grasses as the raw material.  David Tilman and his colleagues published a paper last December in Science arguing that restored native grasslands could be used as a source of biomass for producing liquid fuels.  More significantly, using existing technology, it appears that the resulting fuel production infrastructure would be carbon negative, that is, storing more carbon than emitted during harvesting, processing, and use as fuel.  Tilman, an ecologist at the University of Minnesota and a member of the NAS, lays out his plan with research associate Jason Hill in an essay on checkbiotech.org,  originally carried in The Washington Post on 25 March.  Tilman and Hill summarize the paper in Science as follows:

In a 10-year experiment reported in Science magazine in December, we explored how much bioenergy could be produced by 18 different native prairie plant species grown on highly degraded and infertile soil. We planted 172 plots in central Minnesota with various combinations of these species, randomly chosen. We found, on this highly degraded land, that the plots planted with mixtures of many native prairie perennial species yielded 238 percent more bioenergy than those planted with single species. High plant diversity led to high productivity, and little fertilizer or chemical weed or pest killers was required.

The prairie "hay" harvested from these plots can be used to create high-value energy sources. For instance, it can be mixed with coal and burned for electricity generation. It can be "gasified," then chemically combined to make ethanol or synthetic gasoline. Or it can be burned in a turbine engine to make electricity. A technique that is undergoing rapid development involves bioengineering enzymes that digest parts of plants (the cellulose) into sugars that are then fermented into ethanol.

Whether converted into electricity, ethanol or synthetic gasoline, the high-diversity hay from infertile land produced as much or more new usable energy per acre as corn for ethanol on fertile land. And it could be harvested year after year.

Even more surprising were the greenhouse gas benefits. When high-diversity mixtures of native plants are grown on degraded soils, they remove carbon dioxide from the air. Much of this carbon ends up stored in the soil. In essence, mixtures of native plants gradually restore the carbon levels that degraded soils had before being cleared and farmed. This benefit lasts for about a century.

Across the full process of growing high-diversity prairie hay, converting it into an energy source and using that energy, we found a net removal and storage of about a ton and a half of atmospheric carbon dioxide per acre. The net effect is that ethanol or synthetic gasoline produced from this grass on degraded land can provide energy that actually reduces atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide.

All in all, an exceptionally interesting proposal.  Tilman was a co-author on a Science paper earlier in 2006 that showed high diversity grasslands produce considerably more biomass per acre than monocultures of either grass or corn.  And that healthy prairie full of perennial grasses serves as habitat for all kinds of other wildlife, suggesting this approach could be a big win in many different ways.

But you still have to turn the raw biomass into fuel, and that is where Synthetic Biology will probably play a role.  Not in open fields, but in contained vats where microbes, first with modified enzymes, then later with altogether new pathways, will eat the harvested grasses and turn it into fuels.  This is an explicit focus of the new biofuels institute at UC Berkeley/LBL and the University of Minnesota, funded to the tune of $500 million by BP (story in Nature, from BP, and UCB).  And start ups like LS9 and Amyris are pouring effort into building microbes that directly produce fuels from simple feedstocks.

While this seems like a relatively straightforward path to producing significant amounts of ethanol, biodiesel, and eventually butanol, it will probably take 5-10 years before anything hits the market.  Then again, much of this is more a matter of money and organization than science.  We could get significant supplies of biofuels soon depending on our choices.

Chip Fab Now Costs US$2.5 Billion

Chip fabs just keep getting more expensive.  The AP, via Wired, reports that Intel is investing US$2.5 billion in a new factory in China.  The facility will churn out chips only for the Chinese market, evidently, and using old technology.  U.S. export rules require that Intel restrict the fab to using 90-nm processing, whereas chips made and sold in the U.S. will soon use a 45-nm process.

And biology just keeps getting cheaper.

Update on Public Access to "Genome Synthesis and Design Futures"

Due to confusion about access to "Genome Synthesis and Design Futures", I would like to make a clarification.  The original order page was not as clear as it could have been.  The report is publicly available, and is available as a free PDF or via a print-on-demand service for $95.  There are no restrictions to obtaining a copy, unless you are shy or are obviously misrepresenting yourself.  While the report does not contain sensitive material, Bio-era is requiring registration to receive a copy in an effort to both track interest and be a responsible public citizen.  I think it is rather ironic that the decision to require registration has been the target of public criticism by people who have made a business of making noise about restricting access to, and progress in, biological technologies.

Here is the new, clearer, web page.

Thoughts on Open Biology

A story at LinuxDevices last year on a report from the Committee for Economic Development (CED), recommending government use of "open source" and "open research", prompted me to collect the following thoughts on Open Biology.

I've changed the entry in my category list for this blog from "Open Source Biology" to "Open Biology".  Despite unleashing the phrase "Open Source Biology" on the world six years ago, at this point I no longer know what Open Source Biology might be.  Perhaps Drew Endy still has a  useful definition in mind, but as I try to understand how to maintain progress, improve safety, and keep the door open for economic growth, I think the analogy between software and biology just doesn't go far enough.  Biology isn't software, and DNA isn't code.  As I study the historical development of railroads, electricity, aviation, computer hardware, computer software, and of the availability of computation itself (distributed, to desktop, and back to distributed; or ARPANet to Microsoft Office to Google Apps), I am still trying to sort out what lessons can be applied to biological technologies.  I have only limited conclusions about how any such lessons will help us plan for the future of biology.

When I first heard Drew Endy utter the phrase "Open Source Biology", it was within the broader context of living in Berkeley, trying to understand the future of biology as technology, and working in an environment (the then embryonic Molecular Sciences Institute) that encouraged thinking anything was possible.  It was also within the context of Microsoft's domination of the OS market, the general technology boom in the San Francisco Bay area, the skyrocketing cost of drug development coupled to a stagnation of investment return on those dollars, and the obvious gap in our capabilities in designing and building biological systems.  OSB seemed the right strategy to get to where I thought we ought to be in the future, which is to create the ability to tinker effectively,  perhaps someday even to engineer biology, and to employ biology as technology for solving some of the many problems humans face, and that humans have created.

As in 2000, I remain today most interested in maintaining, and enhancing, the ability to innovate.  In particular, I feel that safe and secure innovation is likely to be best achieved through distributed research and through distributed biological manufacturing.  By "Open Biology" I mean access to the tools and skills necessary to participate in that innovation and distributed economy.

"Open source biology" and "open source biotechnology" are catchy phrases, but they have little if any content for the moment.  As various non-profits get up and running (e.g., CAMBIA and the BioBrick Foundation), some of the vagaries will be defined, and at least we will have some structure to talk about and test in the real world.  When there is a real license a la the GPL, or the Lesser License, and when it is finally tested in court we will have some sense of how this will all work out.

I am by no means saying work should stop on OSB, or on figuring out the licenses, just that I don't understand how it fits into helping innovation at the moment.  A great deal of the innovation we need to see will not come from academia or existing corporations, but from people noodling around in their garages or in start-ups yet to be founded.  These are the customers for Biobricks, these are the people who want the ability to build biological systems without needing an NIH grant.

But Drew Endy (Biobricks) and Richard Jefferson (CAMBIA) have as primary customers not corporations, hobbyists, or tinkerers, but large foundations and governments.  The marketplace in which Biobricks and CAMBIA compete for funding values innovation and the promise of changing the world.  At present, they do not derive the majority of their funding from actually selling parts or licenses on the open market, and thus do not rely on sales to fund their work.  Nor should they.  But the rest of our economy operates on exchanges of money for goods and services.  Synthetic Biology will get there some day, too, but the transition is still a bit murky for me.  The Bio-era research report, "Genome Synthesis and Design Futures: Implications for the U.S. Economy", of which I am a co-author, points to the utility of Synthetic Biology and Biobricks in producing biofuels, vaccines, and new materials.  However, the implementation of the new technological framework of genome design, enabled by large scale gene synthesis and composable parts with defined properties, is still in the offing.

Janet Hope has made an initial study of the state of Open Source Biotechnology in her Ph.D. dissertation at Australia National University.  Janet gives the following definition for her project:

"Open Source Biotechnology" refers to the possibility of extending the principles of commerce-friendly, commons-based peer production exemplified by Open Source software development to the development of research tools in biomedical and agricultural biotechnology.

This project examines the feasibility of Open Source Biotechnology in the current industry environment. In particular, it explores:       

1. Whether it would be possible to run a viable biotechnology business on Open Source principles, and

2. What such a business might look like, including the application of specific Open Source-style licences to particular classes of biotechnology research tools.

Janet's book on the subject is due out later this year from Harvard Press.  My book on all of this stuff is, um, not finished.

The CED report  "concludes that openness should be promoted as a matter of public policy, in order to foster innovation and economic growth in the U.S. and world economies."  I think this bit, in particular, is very interesting (quoting from the LinuxDevices story):

  • Open Innovation (such as 'peer production' systems like WikiPedia and eBay user ratings)

    • To foster open innovation, federally funded, non-classified research should be widely disseminated, following the example of the NIH (National Institute of Health)
    • "Any legislation or regulation regarding intellectual property rights [should be] weighed with a presumption against the granting of new rights ... because of the benefits to society of further innovation through greater access to technology."
    • The NSF (National Science Foundation) should fund research into "alternative compensation methods, similar to those created to facilitate the growth of radio, to reward creators of digital information products"

The first point is a bit off, since most NIH sponsored research, as a practical matter, available only through subscriptions to the journals in which it is published.  This will slowly get fixed, however, with increasing publication via the Public Library of Science and similar efforts.  The second point, embodied in patent reform, will probably take forever and will be hobbled by vested interests.  The third may not produce useful results for many years.

So here we sit, needing much fast innovation in biological technologies in order to produce carbon neutral fuels, improve human health, and deal with emerging threats such as SARS and pandemic influenza.  Open Biology is part of that, somehow, but I still don't see a clear path to implementing the ideas within the context of the real economic system we live in every day.

Farewell PEAR Lab -- You were always overripe.

News in the last few weeks that the Princeton Engineering Anomalies Research Lab -- the PEAR Lab -- is shutting down.  The PEAR Lab, run by Dr. Robert Jahn, the former Dean of Engineering, was by no means celebrated at Princeton.  I spent four years there in graduate school and only heard of the Lab during my last year, in Malcolm Browne's science writing class no less, rather than during all those many hours in Jadwin Hall.

Phillip Ball had a nice retrospective on the Lab in last week's Nature entitled, "When research goes PEAR-shaped."  Ball quotes Will Happer, a professor in the Princeton Physics Department and a member of JASON as saying, "I don't believe in anything [Jahn] is doing, but I support his right to do it."  That's pretty charitable, actually, compared with many of the things said about the lab.  Nature continues to pile it on this week, with another piece: "The lab that asked the wrong questions," by Lucy Odling-Smee.

This is the crux of what was wrong with the PEAR Lab.  In that science writing class, Malcolm Browne occasionally brought in people to be "interviewed" by the class, and one day we had someone in from the Lab.  (My recollection is that it was Jahn himself.)  Can't say I was impressed.  But data is data, and they certainly may actually have measured something interesting, however unlikely that may be.  There are many things we can't yet explain about the universe, and maybe Jahn was on to something.

What I found unfortunate, even unpleasant, in the way the data was presented was the context.  Jahn was represented to us not just as an expert in aeronautics, but also in a whole host of other fields, including quantum mechanics.  And we were offered a physical theory "explaining" one experiment, supposedly a quantum mechanical theory.  Here's the problem: that theory, by its very nature, is wrong.  It is inconsistent in its conception and structure with all the rest of quantum mechanics.  The folks in the PEAR Lab were definitely asking the wrong questions, in a very deep physical sense, by which I mean that everything about the way they tried to explain the data I saw was contradicted by modern physics in fundamental ways. 

According to Dr. Jahn, a random process seems to be the vital ingredient for anomalous interactions between consciousness and machines -- coins flipping, balls dropping through a forest of pegs, even electronic random number generators -- which is what led him to speculate about connections between his data and a successful theory in which measurements are probabilistic: quantum mechanics.  In some interpretations of quantum mechanics, the observer and the system observed are both part of a larger closed system.  Indeed, Dr. Jahn and his colleagues believe that quantum mechanics may be just a part of a larger theory that includes phenomena studied in the PEAR Lab.  If this is so, then one would expect the structure of the two theories to be similar.

The theory we were told about was purported to explain how an observer could, by thinking "slower" or "faster", change the period of a large pendulum, something like 2 meters in length, if I recall correctly.  A brief refresher on the relevant classical physics: the period of an ideal pendulum is determined only by its length and the strength of the force of gravity, at least in the case when oscillation amplitudes are small, and not by its mass, or the kind of bearing it is suspended from, or any other factor. Though friction will eventually damp a real pendulum by changing its amplitude, not its period.   

The mechanism by which human consciousness might change the period is not easy to imagine.  The human observer states the intention either to increase or decrease the period, and as the pendulum interrupts photodiodes on each swing the time is recorded.  But whereas a quantum mechanical model requires a probability for the observer to intentionally alter, here the observer is actually trying to intentionally change the period.

Before I go on (and on), you must be asking "Why spend so much time on this?"  Why bother to debunk bad science at all?  Because the universe is full of strange and wonderful things, and we don't yet understand them all.  That's what makes life interesting.  Besides, I like thinking about quantum mechanics.  Back to the story.

Dr. Jahn claimed his data is consistent with the the human subject affecting the damping of the pendulum's oscillation.  Microscopically, friction might be changed by heating or cooling the bearings of the pendulum (which could be tested by carefully measuring the temperature of the bearing during an experiment) causing the atoms in the bearing to move around more or less, a phenomena well understood in statistical mechanics -- and in fact a probabilistic effect.  However, since the operator was not trying to influence this probability distribution, it is not clear how his or her binary intention of changing the period of the pendulum was converted into changing the amount of friction.  Or perhaps the observer was changing the length of the pendulum, or the overall strength of gravity, or even the local coupling of the earth's mass to that of the pendulum.  Still no obvious connection to any distribution.

When asking a question of a quantum mechanical system, or a quantum mechanical question in the parlance of physicists, it must be one which can be phrased in terms of what is called an "operator."  Energy, momentum, and position are all operators and as such provide tools for asking quantum mechanical questions.  The energy operator, for instance, would be used to ask about the average energy of the atoms in the bearing.  To find an analogy to the pendulum we must look in quantum mechanics to something called a harmonic oscillator, which can be imagined as a ball rolling back and forth at the bottom a parabolic bowl.  Two operators used in asking questions about such a system are the raising and lowering operators, which as their names suggest change the energy of a particle and its period of oscillation.

So, for the sake of argument, let's give the PEAR Lab a quantum mechanical operator that works on a macroscopic pendulum.  It might be imagined that a human consciousness is utilizing some sort of raising and lowering operator by intending to increase or decrease the period of oscillation of the pendulum.  Yet the data is fit by assuming the friction in the bearing is changing.  It is simply not consistent with the structure of quantum mechanics to ask one valid question and get the answer to a different valid question.  Furthermore, it is hard to imagine how a more general theory, one subsuming quantum mechanics -- oh, what the hell, let's just call it "magic" -- could account for asking a question of the period of the pendulum with an operator belonging to the "magic" theory but get an answer which is the result of asking a question with the well known and well loved energy operator of quantum mechanics and which could only describe the microscopic state of the bearing.  So there.

Then there is that little thing called the Correspondence Principle, proven correct time and time again, which says that quantum mechanics works for small numbers of atoms.  As the number grows, save in very special, very strange circumstances like Bose-Einstein condensates, your theory must reduce to classical physics.  Which brings us back to the classical model that the period of the pendulum depends only on its length.  Nothing about the bearing, nothing about the observer.  Moreover, the pendulum is big, and the human subject is big.  Many, many atoms.  No quantum mechanics.  Wrong question!

Did you follow all that?  Does your head hurt?  Sometimes quantum mechanics does that, I assure you.  But I suppose "magic" could account for your headache, too.  We must allow for that.  Somehow.  See the PEAR Lab.

Sometimes the exploration of something that seems silly results in important insights, and the rest of the time it is important to keep the human participants of science honest.  That's the way science works.  And science always wins.

Stewart Brand -- “Where are the green biotech hackers?”

Tomorrow's New York Times has a great article on Stewart Brand.  In it, he asks the question, “Where are the green biotech hackers?”  We're coming, Stewart.  It's just that we're still on the slow part of the curves.

It's an interesting question, actually -- when do we get to the fast part?  When does biology start to go really fast?  And what does fast mean?

One answer to the question is the speed and the cost at which we can presently sequence or synthesize an interesting genetic circuit or organism.  Costs for reading genes are halving every 18 months or so, and if the rumors are true, we will hit the Thousand Dollar Genome sooner than my original estimate.  Sequencing is pretty easy at this point, as long as you already have a map to work with, which is the case for an increasing number of organisms.  And if you build the organism yourself, or pay someone else to do it, then you already know both the basic structure of the genome (the map) and the specific sequence.

At the moment, synthesis of a long gene takes about four weeks at a commercial DNA foundry, with a bacterial genome still requiring many months at best, though the longest reported contiguous synthesis job to date is still less than 50 kilobases.  And at a buck a base, hacking any kind of interesting new circuit is still expensive.  As I reported from SB 2.0, the synthesis companies are evidently now using my cost estimates as planning devices, even though that's not why made those estimates in the first place.  They project costs to continue falling by a factor of 2 approximately every year, which means that it will be another 5 years before synthesizing something the size of E. coli from scratch will cost less than US$ 1000, or 1 kilobuck.

The bigger problem, though, is the turnaround time.  No engineer or hacker wants to wait four weeks to see if a program works.  Hit compile, wait for four weeks, no "Hello World."  Start trying to debug the bug, with no debugging tools.  No thanks.  (I've actually had discussions with geneticists/molecular biologists who think even waiting a few days for a synthesis job isn't a big deal.  But what can you say -- biology just hasn't been a hacker culture.  And we are the poorer for it.)

So, Mr. Brand, it will be a few years before green hackers, at least those who aren't supported by Vinod Khosla or Kleiner Perkins, really start to have an impact.  The hackers who are lucky enough to have that kind of support, such as the blokes at Amyris Biotechnologies if their past accomplishments are anything to go by, will probably have something to show for themselves pretty soon.

The article ends with a couple of great paragraphs, which, along with "Science is the only news", are all you need to live by:

“I get bored easily — on purpose,” he said, recalling advice from the co-discoverer of DNA’s double helix. “Jim Watson said he looks for young scientists with low thresholds of boredom, because otherwise you get researchers who just keep on gilding their own lilies. You have to keep on trying new things.”

That’s a good strategy, whether you’re trying to build a sustainable career or a sustainable civilization. Ultimately, there’s no safety in clinging to a romanticized past or trying to plan a risk-free future. You have to keep looking for better tools and learning from mistakes. You have to keep on hacking.

"Genome Synthesis and Design Futures: Implications for the U.S. Economy"

After many, many months of work, Bio Economic Research Associates (Bio-era) today released "Genome Synthesis and Design Futures: Implications for the U.S. Economy".  Sponsored largely by Bio-era and the U.S. Department of Energy, with assistance from Dupont and the Berkeley Nanosciences and Nanoengineering Initiative, the report examines the present state of biological technologies, their applications to genome design, and potential impacts on the biomanufacturing of biofuels, vaccines, and chemicals.  The report also employs scenario planning to develop four initial scenarios exploring the effects of technological development and governmental policy.   Here is a link to the press release; over on the right side of the page are links to a short Podcast with myself and Jim Newcomb describing some of the findings.

It is a giant topic, and even at 180 pages we have really just barely scratched the surface.  The changes we've already witnessed will pale in comparison to what's coming down the pike.  The report deals mostly with science, technology, economics, markets, and policy, and only starts to explore the social and ethical aspects of forthcoming decisions.  Future work will refine the technological and economic analyses, will flesh out the security aspects of the ferment in biological technologies, and will delve into what all this means for our society.  In the preface, Jim Newcomb and Steve Aldrich note:

In presenting this analysis, we are mindful of the limitations of its scope. The arrival of new technologies for engineering biological systems for human purposes raises complex questions that lie at the intersection of many different disciplines. As the historian Arthur M. Schlesinger has written, “science and technology revolutionize our lives, but memory, tradition and myth frame our response.” Because this report is focused on potential economic implications of genome engineering and design technologies for the U.S. economy, there are many important questions that are not addressed here. In particular, we have not attempted to address questions of safety and biosecurity; the likelihood or possible impact of unintended consequences, such as environmental damage from the use of these technologies; or the ethical, legal, and social questions that arise. The need for thoughtful answers to these and related questions is urgent, but beyond the scope of this work. We hope to have the opportunity to investigate these questions in subsequent research.

We had a lot of help along the way, and for my part I would like to thank Drew Endy, Brian Arthur, George Church, Tom Kalil, Craig Venter, Gerald Epstein, Jay Keasling, Brad Smith, Erdogan Gulari, John Beadle, Roger Brent, John Mulligan, Michele Garfinkel, Ralph Baric, and Stephen Johnston, and Todd Harrington. 

Here is web page to buy a hard copy and/or download the PDF.  Just fill out the form (we're trying to track interest), and you will be sent a link to the PDF.

On Indonesia and Distribution of H5N1 Strains

News in the last couple of days that Indonesia has decided not to forward homegrown strains of H5N1 to the WHO and instead is dealing directly with Baxter Healthcare for production of vaccines.  The worst bit of this, of course, is that there does not appear to be much cross reactivity elicited by the Vietnamese and Indonesian isolates, where the international reference vaccine is derived from a strain isolated in Vietnam.  Moreover, while Baxter is supposedly making progress in producing influenza vaccines in cell culture (Baxter's Press Releases, CIDRAP's version), this technology is not yet approved for human use; only research contracts, rather than production contracts, have been let by the U.S. Government for cell culture production.  Finally, despite much noise that cell culture is faster/better/cheaper than eggs for producing vaccines, it appears cell culture only beats eggs by a month or two.  (Baxter does have a very comendably decent Influenza information web page, which is here.) 

Here are a few paragraphs from an AP story, "Experts say Indonesian deal on H5N1 virus jeopardizes race for pandemic vaccine", via the IHT:

Indonesia Wednesday signed a memorandum of understanding with U.S. drug manufacturer Baxter Healthcare Corp. to develop a human bird flu vaccine.

Under the agreement, Indonesia will provide H5N1 virus samples in exchange for Baxter's expertise in vaccine production. Other organizations would have access to Indonesian samples provided they agree not to use the viruses for "commercial" purposes, said Siti Fadilah Supari, Indonesia's health minister.

But that is a major departure from the World Health Organization's existing virus-sharing system, where bird flu viruses are freely shared with the global community for public health purposes, including vaccine and antiviral development. Indonesia has not shared any viruses since the beginning of 2007.

Indonesia defended its decision, arguing the system works against poor countries. "The specimens we send to WHO...are then used by vaccine makers who then sell to us (at a profit)," Supari told reporters Wednesday. "This is unfair, we have the virus, we are getting sick, and then they take the virus from WHO — 'with WHO's permission' they say — and make it themselves," said Supari.

There seems to be a bit of confusion among reporters about whether Indonesia now has an official policy of withholding samples from the WHO, but Baxter is making it clear they don't have anything to do with the decision.  From The New York Times' coverage: "A Baxter spokeswoman said the company had not asked Indonesia to stop cooperating with the W.H.O. She added that the agreement under negotiation would not give it exclusive access to Indonesian strains."

In any event, Indonesians feel bent out of shape that they have previously provided strains to the international community, only to be charged for the vaccine when it becomes available.  News reports portray this as something of an IP spat, akin to controversy over biomining.  From the Reuters coverage:

"The specimens we sent to the WHO have been forwarded to their collaborating center. There it has been used for various reasons such as vaccine development ... or research," Supari said.

"Later they sold the discovery to us. This is not fair. We are the ones who got sick. They took the sample through WHO and with WHO consent and they tried to produce it for their own use," she said at a news conference after the signing of the pact with Baxter.

Supari said Australia was producing a human bird flu vaccine using the Indonesian virus strain, but did not give details.

"I was shocked because I never gave permits to Australia to produce a vaccine using our strain," she said.

"We have been working with Baxter since the beginning and are processing intellectual property rights with them. Baxter protects our intellectual property rights," she said.

...Under the memorandum of understanding, Indonesia would have the right to produce and market the bird flu vaccine domestically. It is negotiating to export it to a number of countries.

Production would be carried out by makers appointed by the Health Ministry.

So, in conclusion, the deal appears to put Indonesian isolates of H5N1 out of the reach of governments and firms with other vaccine technologies, at least for the time being.  Finally, in an interesting twist on the distribution of biological technologies, the deal also appears to put Indonesia in a position to become a leader in cell culture production of vaccines, potentially jumping to the head of the pack in the international vaccine market.

H5N1 is back in the U.K.

The headlines are today loudly announcing the return of H5N1 to the United Kingdom (CNN, New York Times) at a Turkey farm near Lowestoft.  Though nobody can say for sure, the virus probably arrived via migrating birds.  It appears that the likelihood of transmission by migrating bird or smuggled poultry has a geopolitical dependence.

Last month, Kilpatrick, et al., published a paper in PNAS ("Predicting the global spread of H5N1 influenza") that looked at a variety of factors to classify historical outbreaks and predict new ones.  The abstract does a decent job of summarizing the paper, so here it is:

The spread of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza into Asia, Europe, and Africa has resulted in enormous impacts on the poultry industry and presents an important threat to human health. The pathways by which the virus has and will spread between countries have been debated extensively, but have yet to be analyzed comprehensively and quantitatively. We integrated data on phylogenetic relationships of virus isolates, migratory bird movements, and trade in poultry and wild birds to determine the pathway for 52 individual introduction events into countries and predict future spread. We show that 9 of 21 of H5N1 introductions to countries in Asia were most likely through poultry, and 3 of 21 were most likely through migrating birds. In contrast, spread to most (20/23) countries in Europe was most likely through migratory birds. Spread in Africa was likely partly by poultry (2/8 introductions) and partly by migrating birds (3/8). Our analyses predict that H5N1 is more likely to be introduced into the Western Hemisphere through infected poultry and into the mainland United States by subsequent movement of migrating birds from neighboring countries, rather than from eastern Siberia. These results highlight the potential synergism between trade and wild animal movement in the emergence and pandemic spread of pathogens and demonstrate the value of predictive models for disease control.

Of course, the only way to know if the model really works is, alas, to wait for more outbreaks.  Anyway, it seems the U.S. is safe from poultry smuggling, which we have a chance of intercepting, but susceptible to migrating birds, a pathway that almost certainly resists any defensive measures.

 

H5N1 Influenza and Countermeasures Update

There is an excellent news piece in last week's Science, where here the definition of excellent is both "informative" and "highly unsettling".  Dennis Normile and Martin Enserink write:

An upsurge in H5N1 bird flu outbreaks in poultry across Asia is driving home the message that even countries that have eliminated the virus once shouldn't become complacent. The continuing high death toll in humans, including two recently detected cases of infection with a Tamiflu-resistant strain in Egypt, is also a grim reminder of how devastating the virus might be if it acquires the ability to spread easily among humans.

...Over the past 3 weeks, Thailand and Vietnam reported their first H5N1 outbreaks among poultry in 6 months. Japan, which seemed to have dodged the bullet since its cluster of outbreaks in 2004, confirmed that the virus hit one farm on 11 January and probably a second farm on the 23rd. South Korea, which last November suffered its first outbreak since containing the virus in 2004, reported that the virus had turned up on a fifth poultry farm. Several wild birds found dead in Hong Kong tested positive for H5N1. And Indonesia on 20 January reported its fifth human death from the virus in just 10 days, bringing its death toll to 62, by far the most of any country.

The increase in outbreaks in the Northern Hemisphere follows what has become an established pattern. The reason for the seasonality is still not well understood, says Les Sims, a veterinarian based in Manunda, Australia, who advises the U.N.'s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). It is likely to be some complex interaction among several factors, including cooler temperatures enabling the virus to survive longer in the environment, greater poultry trade in preparation for winter festivals, and movements of wild birds.

The recurrence of the virus in South Korea and Japan is particularly notable. In both the winter of 2003-'04 and this year, outbreaks in South Korea were followed 4 to 6 weeks later by outbreaks in Japan. "The outbreaks in Japan and South Korea suggest to me free-flying birds as the most likely origin," says Sims. Both countries are trying to determine how the virus was reintroduced.

So it seems unlikely we will be rid of the virus through culling programs, the primary mechanism thus far employed for biosecurity.  That the virus seems to be spread by wild birds in these cases is interesting, but this isn't the only pathway for reintroduction into poultry or people.

Last week's issue of New Scientist revisits the notion that "Deadly H5N1 may be brewing in cats".  (Most of the relevant text is available here at ProMed.)  Felines may be serving as a mammalian host that might enable the virus to adapt to mammalian biology and thereby become more dangerous to humans.  This is something I started wondering about after cats started dying in Europe so soon after the virus arrived there last year.  The New Scientist provides corroborating evidence that cats are important in the dynamics of the virus in Indonesia.  The story reports some surprise on the part of scientists doing the field work with regard to the prevalence of the virus in cats in Indonesia:

In the first survey of its kind, an Indonesian scientist has found that in areas where there have been outbreaks of H5N1 in poultry and humans, 1 in 5 cats have been infected with the virus, and survived. This suggests that as outbreaks continue to flare across Asia and Africa, H5N1 will have vastly more opportunities to adapt to mammals than had been supposed.

Chairul Anwar Nidom of Airlangga University in Surabaya, Indonesia, told journalists last week that he had taken blood samples from 500 stray cats near poultry markets in four areas of Java, including the capital, Jakarta, and one area in Sumatra, all of which have recently had outbreaks of H5N1 in poultry and people.

Of these cats, 20 per cent carried antibodies to H5N1. This does not mean that they were still carrying the virus, only that they had been infected - probably through eating birds that had H5N1. Many other cats that were infected are likely to have died from the resulting illness, so many more than 20 per cent of the original cat populations may have acquired H5N1.

This is a much higher rate of infection than has been found in surveys of apparently healthy birds in Asia. "I am quite taken aback by the results," says Nidom, who also found the virus in Indonesian pigs in 2005. He plans further tests of the samples at the University of Tokyo in February.

The data explicitly contradicts prior statements from the WHO downplaying the role of cats in harboring or spreading the virus, which I wrote about here.  I continue to be fascinated by the extent to which the behavior of the virus in the wild contradicts the expectations and public statements of "officials" in various organizations around the world.  H5N1 is clearly evolving in ways that are both surprising and worrying.

The New Scientist and Science stories both note that two people in Egypt who recently died from H5N1 infections were carrying strains of the virus evidently resistant to  Tamiflu.  It is unclear whether the virus carried the relevant mutations before it infected these patients, or whether it evolved during their illness because they were treated with Tamiflu in the hospital.  Either way, it seems that many people infected with H5N1 are diagnosed after the window in which antivirals are most effective, in part because diagnosis is both difficult and slow.  This phenomenon is described in two articles and a commentary in the 26 November, 2006, issue of The New England Journal of Medicine that report disturbing analyses of human H5N1 outbreaks in Indonesia and Turkey last year.

In a New York Times article about the NEJM papers, Donald Mcneil, reports the following:

Rapid tests on nose and throat swabs failed every time, and in Turkey, so did all follow-up tests known as Elisas. The only tests that consistently worked were polymerase chain reaction tests, or PCRs, which can be done only in advanced laboratories and take several hours.

''It'll be a disaster if we have to use PCRs for everybody,'' said Dr. Anne Moscona, a professor of pediatrics and immunology at Weill Cornell Medical College. ''It just isn't available at a whole lot of places.''

If the A(H5N1) flu mutates into a pandemic strain, rapid tests ''will be really key,'' she said.

What the NYT didn't report is that the patients were infected on average 5 days prior to the appearance of symptoms, outside the window recognized for effective use of antiviral drugs.  Robert Webster and Elena Govorkova have an excellent Perspective piece accompanying the NEJM articles, and they note that in the Indonesian cases, "...Treatment [with oseltamivir] began 5 to 7 days after initial infection.  Such delayed administration of the drug limits its value in decreasing the viral load and might lead to the selection of resistant strains."  It isn't clear from the paper describing the Turkey outbreak when oseltamivir was administered, but those patients did not experience symptoms for an average of 5 days after exposure to the virus, and then received antibiotics for the first 3-7 days of hospitalization before transfer to a unit that treated them for influenza.  In summary, it appears the virus is often being exposed to oseltamivir after the period when the drug is expected to be effective, enhancing the probability of selecting for resistant mutants.

Finally, in a slight change of direction, in the 21 December issue of Nature, John Oxford has a review of a new book on influenza, "Bird Flu: A Virus of Our Own Hatching", by Michael Greger.  You may recall that Oxford is primarily responsible for the hypothesis that the 1918 flu emerged at a British army camp near Etaples, a tale I wrote about a couple of years ago (The Spanish Flu Story).  Oxford notes that:

I am often kicked around by American authors in books about influenza. How dare a Limey suggest that the Spanish influenza A H1N1 virus arose in a gas-infected, pig-ridden and bird-infected army camp of 100,000 people in France in 1916, when the whole world knows it started in Dorothy's home state, Kansas? But I felt less bruised than usual. Perhaps I am getting used to it.

I still find Oxford's version of the origin of the Spanish Flu to be the most compelling, in part because it describes a situation of close contact between animals and people, where those animals were killed and prepared as food by soldiers on a daily basis in conditions not so dissimilar to those in many developing countries where H5N1 is present today.